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Abstract 
 
The performance of the Philippine economy has been hindered by the country’s 
bourgeoning population due to its rapid population growth. For the last decade, the 
Philippines had the highest annual population growth rates in the Southeast Asian region. 
In 2009, it has become the second most populous country in the region with a population 
of more than 92 million, next only to Indonesia. Unfortunately, these have resulted to 
forgone economic growth, losing the chance to improve the poverty situation in the 
country. Thus, it is imperative to speed up the demographic transition in the country 
through proactive government population management policies aimed at harvesting the 
demographic dividends quickly. By performing simulation analyses on total fertility rate 
(TFR) under two scenarios, it was shown that the Philippines can hardly experience in the 
near future the Goldilock period, or the generation when fertility rate is neither too high 
nor too low, especially when the government does nothing to address the problem. Under 
the business-as-usual scenario, the Goldilock period will be reached by year 2030, or 
twenty years from now. In the second scenario where the government intervention targets 
only the households with unwanted fertility, the Goldilock period will be achieved ten 
years earlier, or in about 2020. 
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I.  Demographic Transition and the Demographic Dividend  
 
 
 The rapid population growth in the Philippines over the last several decades has 
hindered the country’s economic development. For the period 2000 - 2009, the 
Philippines had one of the highest population growth rates in the Southeast Asian region 
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at 2.04 percent (as of 2007) and the second largest population of more than 92 million in 
2009, next only to Indonesia. It comes as no surprise that in 2006, 32.9 percent of our 
population, or an equivalent of 28 million Filipinos were living below the poverty line 
(NSCB, 2006). The core idea which links population and economic growth is 
demographic transition described as “a change from a situation of high fertility and high 
mortality to one of low fertility and low mortality.” A country that enters into a 
demographic transition experiences sizable changes in the age distribution of the 
population and this affects economic growth.  
 
 Unlike its Southeast and East Asian neighbors, the Philippines failed to achieve a 
demographic transition similar to what its neighbors had in the past three decades. All of 
these countries' (including the Philippines) mortality rates broadly declined at similar 
rates. In the Philippines however, fertility rates dipped slowly; so while population 
growth rates substantially dropped to below 2 percent a year in other countries (such as 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam), the Philippines’ high population growth rate of more 
than 2 percent per year hardly changed.  
 
 Studies show that demographic transition accounts for a significant portion (about 
one-third) of the economic growth experienced by East Asia’s economic “tigers” during 
the period 1965 to 1995 (Bloom and Williamson, 1997). The effect of the demographic 
transition on income growth is known as the first demographic dividend. In the course of 
the demographic transition, countries experience an increasing share of the working age 
population relative to the total population and this creates favorable effects on the per 
capita income. In addition to the first dividend, there is another positive effect on 
economic growth and is referred to as the second demographic dividend. This dividend 
results when individuals accumulate savings in their working years to serve as buffer 
during their retirement years. While accumulation of capital can be used to deal with the 
lowering of income in the older ages, this capital also influences economic growth. As 
Mason (2007) points out, it is when society increases its saving rate that results in a more 
rapid economic growth – creating the second demographic dividend. Mason estimated 
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that first and second demographic dividend account for 37.7% of the yearly average per 
capita growth rate of Japan from 1950 to 1980. 
 
II. The Goldilock Period and High Economic Growth 
 
 As countries move from large families (high fertility rate) and poverty into small 
families (low fertility), high economic growth and ageing, they pass through what is 
called a Goldilock period: a generation or two in which fertility rate is neither too high 
nor too low (The Economist, October 2009). This fertility rate consistent with stable 
population is about 2.1 (also known as the replacement rate of fertility). The fall to 
replacement fertility is a unique and precious opportunity for higher economic growth. 
The figures in Table 1 show the Total Fertility Rates (TFR) for select countries in East 
Asia from the period 1960 to 2006. The table shows that poor and rich countries are 
racing though the demographic transition and achieving the replacement fertility rate of 
2.1: Singapore in the mid-1970s, South Korea in mid-1980s, Thailand in 1990, Vietnam 
and Myanmar in 2006.  
 
 It is interesting to note that only three (3) countries in the table have TFR of more 
than 3.0 in 2006: the Philippines (3.30), Lao PDR (3.29) and Cambodia (3.27). Moreover, 
Lao PDR and Cambodia have reduced their TFR much faster than the Philippines, having 
TFRs of about 6 during the 1990s compared to the Philippines’ TFR of 4.31. It will be 
disheartening to see that years down the road, Lao PDR and Cambodia will enjoy the 
dividend associated with the demographic transition and transform their economies to the 
level that will improve the lives of millions of their citizens, while the Philippines 
continues to languish in the high population growth-high poverty incidence trap.  
 
Table 1. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for Selected East Asian Countries 
Country 
Year 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
South Korea 5.67 4.53 2.83 1.59 1.47 1.13 
ASEAN 5 
Singapore 5.45 3.09 1.74 1.87 1.44 1.26 
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Thailand 6.40 5.33 3.21 2.11 1.86 1.85 
Indonesia 5.52 5.35 4.36 3.10 2.42 2.23 
Malaysia 6.81 5.47 4.21 3.68 2.96 2.65 
Philippines 6.96 6.20 5.17 4.31 3.62 3.30 
Rest of SE Asia 
Vietnam 6.05 5.89 4.97 3.62 1.90 2.08 
Myanmar 6.06 5.98 4.54 3.38 2.41 2.10 
Brunei Darussalam 6.83 5.62 4.04 3.20 2.58 2.34 
Cambodia 6.29 5.81 5.84 5.73 3.96 3.27 
Lao PDR 6.42 6.42 6.41 6.08 4.03 3.29 
TFR is the average number of children a woman would bear during her lifetime given current age-
specific fertility rates 
Source: World Development Indicators 2008 
 
 
 The results of the study by Mapa and Balisacan (2004), using cross-country data 
from 80 countries over the period 1975 to 2000, showed that the difference in the 
population structure of Thailand and the Philippine accounts for about 0.768 percentage 
point of forgone average annual growth (missed first dividend) for the Philippines from 
1975 to 2000. This forgone growth accumulates to about 22 percent of the average 
income per person in the year 2000. It is even more impressive when translated into 
monetary values. It would have meant that rather than a per capita GDP of US$993 for 
the year 2000, Filipinos would have gotten US$1,210 instead. Moreover, poverty 
incidence would have been reduced by about 3.6 million. Less Filipinos would have been 
counted among the poor by the year 2000. 
 
Speeding up the Demographic Transition 
 
 The effects of rapid population growth (or high fertility level) on economic growth 
and poverty have been carefully studied, documented and quantified by researchers and 
the results point to the same conclusion: that rapid population growth in poor and 
developing countries hinders economic development which pushes the next generation 
into the poverty trap. The Philippines appears to be the only country in all of Asia, and 
perhaps one of the few in the world, where the population issue remains controversial to 
this day.   
5 
 
 
 The main policy issue that should be addressed immediately is how to harvest the 
demographic dividend quickly. Advocates of speeding the demographic transition placed 
emphasis on the need for public effort to accelerate voluntary reduction in fertility rates 
as soon as possible. Sachs (2008) pointed out that “demographic transitions, where they 
have occurred, have typically been accelerated and even triggered, by proactive 
government policies.” Thus, there is a need to influence public policies that play an 
important role in assisting, particularly the poor households, in achieving a voluntary 
reduction in fertility rates. This will relieve the direct pressures of population growth, 
particularly unwanted fertility estimated to contribute about 16% of the future population 
growth, through direct population policies.  
 
 The current strategy of reducing total fertility rate by relying on the Natural 
Family Planning (NFP) methods clearly will not bring us to the Goldilock period at a 
faster pace. Even the Health Secretary Esperanza Cabral realized this when she 
acknowledged that “even as population growth is coming down, it is not coming down at 
the rate necessary to improve the socioeconomic status of the country.” (Interview, 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 28, 2010) 
 
III. Simulation Analysis of Total Fertility Rate (TFR) under Two Scenarios 
 
 The slow pace by which the total fertility rate has been reduced (from 6.96 in 
1960 to 3.30 in 2006 or a measly 1.6 percent per year) can be attributed to a lack of 
concrete and proactive government policies on population management aimed at 
accelerating the demographic transition. What then will the TFR of the country in the 
future under the same set of policies (e.g. gearing towards the use of the natural family 
planning methods)? When do we achieve the Goldilock period that is conducive for 
higher economic growth under the status quo?    
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 An essential variable that reduces fertility rate is income. Studies have shown that 
as the income of the household increases, the fertility rate tends to decrease.  Figure 1 
shows the relationship between regional per capita income (in natural logarithm) and the 
regional total fertility rates from 1993 to 2006. The TFR regional data is generated from 
the National Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) while the regional per capita 
income came from the Regional Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) report of the National 
Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB). The figure shows that as the income of the 
regions increase, the TFR decrease. It should be noted that no region has reach a TFR of 
2.1.  
 
Figure 1. Relationship between TFR and per capita GDP 
by Philippine regions (1993-2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Using the relationship between per capita income and TFR, Mapa, Lucagbo and 
Ignacio (2010) built an econometric model to determine the effect of income on TFR, 
controlling for other factors such as education of the household head and labor force 
participation of women, among others. The study shows that increasing per capita income 
by one percent reduces TFR by 0.025 per year. Using the results of the study, simulation 
analysis was made to plot the path of the country’s TFR under two scenarios.  
 
7 
 
 Scenario 1 is the business as usual scenario where TFR is reduced mainly as a 
result of increasing income. This scenario assumes that the country’s GDP is growing at 
an average of 4 percent per year (and thus per capita GDP is growing at 2 percent per 
year, net of the population growth of about 2 percent per year). Scenario 2 assumes the 
same average income growth of 4 percent plus government intervention to relieve the 
population pressure from unwanted fertility, estimated to account for 16 percent of the 
future population growth. To be more realistic, scenario 2 further assumes that only 90 
percent of the households with unwanted fertility will be covered by the government 
program.  
 
 The current and future TFRs under these two scenarios are presented in Figure 2. 
Using the 2008 TFR of 3.3 as base value, in the business as usual scenario 1, the 
Goldilock period will be reached by 2030, or twenty years from now. In the second 
scenario where government intervention targets only households with unwanted fertility, 
the Goldilock period will be achieved 10 years early or in about 2020.         
 
 
Figure 2. Total Fertility Rates under Two Scenarios 
 
  
 The same simulation exercise was made for the poorest 40 percent of the 
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country is 3.30, the TFR of the poorest 20 percent (or the bottom quintile) is at 5.20 and 
the second quintile at 4.20. The values in Table 2 show that, under the status quo, the 
households in the bottom quintile will not experience the Goldilock period in this 
generation. The TFR of the poorest 20 percent of the households 30 years from now (or 
in 2040) will be at 3.47. This estimated TFR in 2040 will still be higher than the recorded 
TFR of Thailand in 1980 at 3.21. Under scenario 2 where government intervenes through 
proactive population management policies, the TFR of the poorest 20 percent will be at a 
manageable level of 2.31 by the year 2040.  
 
 For households in the second quintile, the TFR will still be at 2.47 in year 2040 
under the status quo, while the Goldilock period will be achieved earlier in year 2030 
when the TFR for this group is projected to be at 2.07. 
 
Table 2. Total fertility rates of the second and bottom quintile under two scenarios 
 2008 2010 2020 2030 2040 
Second quintile      
Scenario 1 4.20 4.09 3.55 3.01 2.47 
Scenario 2 4.20 3.16 2.62 2.07 1.53 
Bottom quintile      
Scenario 1 5.20 5.10 4.55 4.01 3.47 
Scenario 2 5.20 3.93 3.39 2.85 2.31 
 
 
IV. Mainstreaming Population Management in the Development Agenda  
 
 Addressing the poverty problem is the single most important policy challenge 
facing the country today and one cannot ignore the growing number of empirical 
evidence linking population growth on the one hand and poverty on the other. 
Development policies aimed at addressing the alarming poverty incidence in the country 
must include measures that will manage the country’s bourgeoning population and bring 
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down the fertility rate to a level that is conducive to higher economic growth. Policy 
makers must address the country’s rapid population growth head-on though proactive 
government policies, such as the Reproductive Health (RH) bill. The failure to pass the 
RH bill in the 14
th
 Congress is very unfortunate for the damage that a rapid population 
growth will bring to this generation and the next are irreversible. We simply cannot 
afford to have millions of Filipinos go through the vicious cycle of high fertility and 
poverty:  high fertility rate prolongs poverty in households and poor households 
contribute to high fertility rates.  
 
 Government must intervene to break this cycle by creating policies that will 
increase the capacity of women to participate in the labor market, invest in health to 
decrease child mortality and enhance education, particularly of women. These are the 
policies that have been found successful in reducing fertility rates in households. At the 
same time, government must also directly intervene by, for example, providing 
contraceptive services to poor households that cannot afford these contraceptive services 
for, without such government support, the fertility rates in these households will remain 
high and unmanageable condemning them to poverty. We cannot afford to ignore the 
population issue because population gravely affects our country’s growth and 
development and as it is, we are paying a high price for our rapid population growth.  
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